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Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming 
Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data 
Farming Workshop is named after a 
farming implement. In farming, a 
scythe is used to clear and harvest. We 
hope that the “Scythe” will perform a 
similar role for our data farming 
community by being a tool to help 
prepare for our data farming efforts 
and harvest the results. The Scythe is 
provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu.  
Please contact the editors for 
additional paper copies.
Please let us know what you think of 
this seventh prototypical issue. 
Articles, ideas for articles and 
material, and any commentary are 
always appreciated.
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International Data Farming Community
Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of 
Data Farming, its methodologies, applications, 
tools, and evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the 
biannual International Data Farming Workshops, 
where researchers participate in team-oriented 
model development, experimental design, and 
analysis using high performance computing 
resources... that is, Data Farming. 
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International Data Farming Workshop 19 was held in Auckland from November 1st through 6th, 2009.  This workshop was the 
third we have held in New Zealand and as usual, it was a magnificent venue!  Our theme was “Mana.”  In the Maori culture, 
having mana means to have influence, authority, effectiveness, power, usefulness, and prestige.   And our goal, as usual, was 
to use our mana as well as our data farming methods to explore our important questions.
On behalf of our host Dr. Michael Lauren from the Defense Technology Agency of New Zealand, I would like to express our 
thanks to the team leaders, the plenary speakers and all of the participants in IDFW 19.  And, of course, a large Thank You to 
Michael and all of the folks from New Zealand who worked to make IDFW 19 a world-class event!
This issue, our seventh, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort.  And, as always, the plenary session 
materials, in-briefs, and out-briefs from this workshop are available online at http://harvest.nps.edu along with electronic copies 
of this issue of The Scythe. 
The plan continues to be to hold even-numbered workshops once a year in Monterey with odd-numbered workshops 
taking place at international venues.  So looking ahead, our Data Farming community will be back in Monterey, California, USA 
for our next workshop, International Data Farming Workshop 20.  I would like to invite you to participate, starting with the pre-
workshop dinner on March 21st, 2010.  The workshop will be held from March 22nd through March 25th, ending on Thursday 
this time.  Our theme for IDFW 20 is... ”Enrichment.”   We hope to see you there!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Gary Horne
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This study investigated a counter-piracy scenario using 
MANA V in conjunction with the data farming process to 
explore options for defending a large vessel, relying 
principally on non-lethal deterrents. 
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
A generic large unarmed vessel (Blue) is transiting through a 
wide area of water at an economical cruise speed. An agent 
representing a cluster of pirates (Red) then closes in on it. 
Once Blue determines their intent, it attempts to manoeuvre 
away and if required, employs a non-lethal weapon (NLW) 
to disrupt Red. 
The critical assumptions in this scenario concern the rules 
of engagement. Firstly, it is assumed that Blue would not 
employ evasive manoeuvres or a non-lethal weapon until the 
intent of Red was established. Secondly, it is assumed that Red 
would not attack if the targeted vessel  was being escorted by a 
warship. 
KEY MODEL PARAMETERS
The Blue force consisted of a  single vessel with a  simple 
cookie-cutter sensor, a  non-lethal weapon and a reasonably 
high level of inertia (resistance to acceleration). 
 Factor (units) MANA Value
 Cruise Speed (kt) 7
 Manoeuvre Speed (kt) 15
 Determination of intent range (m) 2,000
 NLW range (m) 100
 NLW hit probability 0.2
Table 1: Blue Force base parameters
The non lethal weapon was modelled using the refuel 
parameter in MANA V, noting that Red must first be classified 
before this can be employed.
The Red force utilises fast highly-manoeuvrable attack 
craft, such as skiffs with outboard motors. The following table 
summarises the Red MANA base parameters:
 Factor (units) MANA Value
 Speed (kt) 25
 NLW Speed (kt) 5
 Inertia (unitless) 0.1
 Fuel (unitless) 1000
Table 2: Red Force base parameters
When influenced by Blue’s non-lethal weapon, Red was 
sent into a trigger state in which its speed was reduced to 5 
knots. 
It was assumed that Blue would surrender if Red closed 
to within 10 m – that is, when Red was close enough to board 
them. 
Fuel was used to model Red motivation, with Blue’s 
NLW degrading it with increasing engagement time. When 
the fuel level reached zero, Red was deemed to have run out 
of motivation. This occurred after 15 minutes of engagement 
time.
EXCURSIONS
Team 1 started by fine-tuning a baseline scenario. The Red 
force was fixed to represent three generic enemy vessel cases; 
slower (10 kt), similar speed (15  kt) and faster (25 kt). The 
following parameters and parameter ranges were identified 
as of being of interest:
 Factor (units) Min Max Step
 Blue Manoeuvre Speed (kt) 15 25 5
 Determination of intent range (m) 1,000 10,00
0
1,000
 NLW range (m) 50 300 50
 NLW hit probability 0.2 1 0.2
 NLW effect duration (s) 4 12 2
 Blue Manoeuvre Speed (kt) 15 25 5
Table 3: Data farming parameter ranges
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This resulted in 4,500 distinct simulation models which 
were each run 30 times using a cloud computing cluster 
provided by NTU.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The principle measure of effectiveness used was whether 
Blue reached their goal. A success for Blue was if it could 
out-manoeuvre Red or keep Red at bay with its non-lethal 
weapon until Red ran out of motivation.
METHODLOGY
According to the parameters specified in Table 2, a  gridded 
data farming experiment was conducted using OldMcData. 
The latter is a  software application which was specifically 
designed (by NPS) to perform data farming experiments. 
Moreover, OldMcData has recently been adapted (by NTU 
and DSO) to support cloud computing infrastructures. This 
cloud computing approach enables one to utilise OldMcData 
on any cloud computing compliant clusters (e.g., the 
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud). This novel approach 
facilitates the use of high performance computing facilities 
and addresses the user’s computing scalability/budget 
issues.
The scenarios were executed on a Singaporean (NTU) 
cloud computer cluster based on the Apache Hadoop 
framework. The results were then analysed using the JMP 
statistical discovery software developed by SAS Institute Inc.
JMP’s partition platform enables users to systematically 
analyse large data sets to discover relationships. JMP uses 
visualisation to create a successive tree of partitions according 
to a  relationship between the X and Y variables. It finds a set 
of cuts or groupings of X values that best predict a Y value by 
exhaustively searching all possible cuts or groupings, 
recursively forming a tree of decision rules until the desired 
fit is reached. 
RESULTS








































































Figure 1: JMP regression tree for Case 1
The regression tree analysis shows that the critical 
parameters (in order) were the non-lethal weapon hit 
probability (NLWHP), non-lethal weapon range (NLWR), 
determination of intent range (DOIR) and non-lethal weapon 
effect duration (NLWED).
A non-lethal weapon effect duration of more than 6 
seconds became critical in the event that Blue had a non-lethal 
weapon with a hit probability of less than 40%, a weapon 
range of less than 100 m and a determination of intent range 
less than 5 km.








































































Figure 2: JMP regression tree for Case 2.1, 
Red speed equal to Blue.
 Figure 3: JMP regression tree for Case 2.2, 
Red speed faster than Blue.
This time the regression tree analysis shows that the 
critical parameters (in order and for both cases 2.1 and 2.2) 
were the non-lethal weapon hit probability (NLWHP), non-
lethal weapon effect duration (NLWED), and non-lethal 
weapon range (NLWR).
The key difference between this and the previous case 
(where Red is slower than Blue) is that increasing the 
determination of intent range (DOIR) did not influence Blue’s 
chance of survival.
Finally, we note that Blue’s chance of survival diminishes 
as the speed of Red increases.
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DISCUSSION
The high inertia of the Blue vessel meant it often failed to 
reach its maximum escape speed after recognising an attack 
was imminent. A better tactic for Blue may therefore be to 
transit at maximum speed the entire time.
This, along with other parameters, could have been 
explored in more detail, however time constraints dictated 
that this be done at a later date. Questions that could be 
explored further include:
• Red motivation: What if Red was willing to continue 
with their attack for longer than 15 minutes?
• Red keep-out range: What if Red was able to get Blue 
to surrender at longer stand-off ranges?
• Initial Blue speed: What if the Blue vessel starts off at 
faster speeds? 
• Blue NLW effect: What if the non-lethal weapon was 
more or less effective at slowing Red down? 
• Blue inertia: What if the Blue vessel was more 
manoeuvrable? 
There was some discussion during the week about the 
MANA V inertia parameter needing to be quantifiable in 
future versions of MANA to be more useful (i.e. that is, have 
physical units associated with it).
CONCLUSION
A long determination of intent range (in this particular 
scenario, greater than 5  km) was only found to be useful in 
the event that Blue had sufficient speed and acceleration to 
out-manoeuvre Red. 
The following general insights into the non-lethal defence 
of a generic large vessel were obtained:
• Use non-lethal weapons that have a high hit 
probability (in this particular scenario, greater than 
40% per shot).
• Use non-lethal weapons that have sufficient range (in 
this particular scenario, 100 m).
• Use a non-lethal weapon that has sufficient effect 
duration (in this particular scenario, greater than 6 
seconds).
Overall, the results provide some interesting insights 
which will inform future analysis.
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Team 2: Impact of Logistics on
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INTRODUCTION
The development of modeling and simulation (M&S) to 
support Total Life Cycle Management (TLCM) is complex 
and requires a close examination of the factors involved and 
results obtained.  The insights derived from M&S can 
contribute significantly to operational readiness and the cost 
of readiness.  Consequently, research is needed to identify 
important data and key TLCM factors.  
In this paper we develop two models that can be used to 
identify critical factors that impact on military readiness and 
the total life cycle cost.  The first one is a simulation model 
using the Arena® simulation language (Kelton et al., 2010). 
This model estimates the operational availability of a major 
weapon system given input parameters under a certain 
scenario.  The second one is an Excel® spreadsheet based life 
cycle cost model that computes the total life cycle cost using 
the same input parameters for the simulation model. 
Although the life cycle cost model can be embedded into the 
simulation model, we intentionally separated it utilizing the 
Excel spreadsheet, so that it can be used by financial 
managers to conduct what-if analyses virtually on any 
personal computer without obtaining a license or learning the 
simulation package.
We have selected the Light Armored Vehicle with a 25 
mm Gun System (LAV-25) for our analysis.  Our scenario 
includes 76 LAV-25s to be deployed with the Marine 
Expeditionary Forces.  We are interested in readiness analysis 
for the LAV-25 fleet and in estimating the total life cycle cost 
over a period of time (typically 20 years).  In this paper we 
only consider operations and maintenance cost without 
including infrastructure, personnel or overhead costs.  The 
models discussed in this paper can be applicable to any major 
weapon systems by providing new data sets.
MODELS
Simulation Model for Operational Availability
There are 76 LAV-25s to be deployed with the Marine 
Expeditionary Forces.  We are interested in readiness 
analysis for the LAV-25 fleet and in estimating a total life 
cycle cost over a period of time (typically 20 years).  In this 
paper we only consider operations and maintenance cost 
without including infrastructure, personnel or overhead 
costs.  
An LAV consists of 1,570  different parts. The data we 
collect from MCDSS indicate that the Marine Corps has spent 
a total of $29,372,715 to purchase all the parts to maintain 
LAVs in 2007 – 2009.  After sorting the data in the order of the 
Extended Price (the total amount of money spent on each 
part; it is calculated by multiplying the part count by the unit 
cost), we note that more than $18 million or approximately 
two-thirds of the total cost were spent on the five parts listed 
in Table 1. These parts are expensive and fail more often than 
others. Also these parts are critical, i.e., if any one of these 
fails, the LAV cannot operate.   We focus on these five parts 
for our analysis.  
In Table 2, the failure rate, the SL quantity, the criticality 
code and the level of repair are shown for each part. 
According to MCDSS 4.3.1.1 Software User Manual, the 
failure rate is the number of failures per million days, which is 
incorrect.  After consulting with the experts in the area, the 
time units were corrected to one calendar day instead of one 
million days.  Even using one day as a time unit, the failure 
rates seem to be too low (i.e., or the parts are too reliable).   In 
our analysis we did not use these failure rates given in Table 2. 
Instead we picked values from a wide range to conduct the 
design of experiments analysis using NOLH.  More details on 
the design of experiments will be presented in the following 
sections. The criticality code (Crit Code in Column 5) 5 
indicates all these parts are critical; any one of these parts fails 
the LAV cannot operate.  The SL quantity (Column 4) 
identifies the total number of part(s) that are required on a 
selected weapon system. The SL quantity of the driving 
differential (Part #3) is 4, which is interpreted as 4 serially 
connected driving differentials in an LAV.  We are assuming 
that if any one of them fails, the LAV will not be operational. If 
the reliability of an individual driving differential is 0.90, the 
subsystem that consists of these 4 serially connected driving 
differentials is only 0.656 (or 0.904). Thus among these 5 parts, 
the driving differential (Part #3) is potentially more critical to 
operational availability of the LAV than other parts.  The SL 
quantity of the laser sensor unit (Part 1) is 2, which means that 
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two of these parts are serially connected.  This part can 
potentially make the critical part list.  
The far right-hand-side column of Table 2 shows the level 
of repair for each component.  Control display units (Part #2) 
and driving differentials (Part #3) are repaired at the 
intermediate-level (I-level) maintenance facility while laser 
sensor units (Part #1), and diesel engines (Parts #4 and #5) are 
maintained at the depot level (D-level).  D-level as compared 
to I-level takes much longer turnaround time.
 Part Name
Part 
Count Unit Price Extended Price * 
1 SENSOR UNIT,LASER 120 $89,794 $10,775,318
2 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 103 $27,683 $3,072,854
3 DIFFERENTIAL,DRIVING 101 $22,475 $2,269,978
4 ENGINE,DIESEL I 31 $41,757 $1,544,995
5 ENGINE,DIESEL I 36 $26,890 $1,075,609
Table 1: The Five Major Components for LAV 
(in terms of the Extended Price)
[Source: MCDSS 4.3.1.1,  PartUsage_EO947 (2007-2009)]







1 SENSOR UNIT,LASER 0.000211638 2 5 D-level
2 CONTROL DISPLAY UNIT 0.000363312 1 5
I-level
3 DIFFERENTIAL,DRIVING 8.90643E-05 4 5
I-level
4 ENGINE,DIESEL I 0.000109346 1 5
D-level
5 ENGINE,DIESEL II 0.000126983 1 5 D-level
Table 2: Failure Rate, SL Quantity, Criticality Code and Level of 
Repair for Each Part
[Source: Same as TABLE 1]
We consider the five critical 
components as shown in Table 1 
for this study.  When any of these 
parts fails, the faulty part is 
removed from the LAV, an RFI 
(ready-for-issue) spare is installed, 
and the faulty part is sent to the 
repair facility (I-level or D-level). 
After the repair is complete, the 
repaired part becomes an RFI 
spare and is sent to the spare pool. 
When a critical part fails, and an 
RFI spare is not available, the LAV 
will be non-operational, or not 
mission capable, until an RFI part 
is available.  
The ranges of the failure 
rates  (λi) of the individual parts 
are provided in Table 3, along 
with the ranges of the number of 
spare parts, repair turnaround 
times (I-TAT and D-TAT), and the 
operational tempo.  The failure rate (λi) is expressed in terms 
of the number of failures per operating hour. The minimum λi 
value of 0.0001 failures per operating hour is equivalent to an 
MTBF of 25 years (= 1 / 0.0001 / 400) assuming an 
operational tempo of 400 hours per year.  The maximum 
value of 0.005 failures per operating hour is equivalent to an 
MTBF of 0.5 years (= 1 / 0.005 / 400) at the same operational 
tempo.  The spare levels are set at 1 through 10.  The I-level 
and D-level turnaround times are set at 5 – 15 days and 30 – 
60 days, respectively.  Since the average operational tempo 
during the peace time is approximately 350 hours per year, 
and during the war time, is approximately 650 hours per 
year, we set the range of the operational tempo from 300 to 
700 hours per year. We assume that the time between failures 
for each component follows an exponential distribution.  Our 
simulation model estimates the average operational 
availability.  Our goal is to better understand how changes in 
reliabilities (in terms of the failure rate, λi), number of spares 
for each part, repair turnaround times, and operational tempo 
impact operational availability and the life cycle cost. 
Input Parameter Range
lambda i (λi,  i = 1, 2, …, 5)
0.0001 – 0.005 
failures per operating hr
spare i ( i = 1, 2, …, 5) 1 - 10
I-TAT (I-level turnaround time) 5 – 15 days
D-TAT (D-level turnaround time) 30 – 60 days
Op Tempo 300 – 700 hrs/yr
Table 3. Ranges of Input Parameters
Several designs are possible, but we use an NOLH with 
257 runs (Cioppa and Lucas 2006).  This design is capable of 
handling up to 29 factors without increasing the number of 
scenarios. It can be easily constructed by entering the low and 
high values in Table 3 into a spreadsheet (Sanchez 2006). (We 
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Figure 1. A Sample Screen Shot of the Arena Simulation Model
remark that that 13 input factors could be examined using a 
NOLH with as few as 33 scenarios if the time required for 257 
runs was prohibitively long.)  Because our model runs 
quickly, we opt for a larger design to allow a more detailed 
investigation of our model’s behavior.  The input parameters 
for the first ten scenarios are shown in Table 4. In all, there are 
13 different simulation input parameters used as factors for 
our designed experiment.  In addition, there is a stochastic 
element that occurs due to the pseudo-random numbers 
generated for stochastic failure times, and repair turnaround 
times (I-level or D-level).
For each scenario, the simulation model reads a row of 
data from the spreadsheet excerpted in Table 4.  The failure 
rates (λi, i = 1, 2, …,5) of the five parts are first read, followed 
by the number of spares for each 
part, the I-level turnaround time 
(I_TAT), the D-level turnaround 
time (D_TAT) and the operational 
tempo (Op_Temp). The λi values 
are expressed in terms of the 
number of failures per operating 
hour.  The time between part 
failures is assumed to follow an 
exponential distribution for all 5 
components we study. The repair 
turnaround times are assumed to 
follow symmetric triangular 
distributions with lower and upper 
bounds of 0.5(mean) and 1.5
(mean), respectively.   
The simulation model was 
developed using the Arena 
simulation language.  A sample 
screen shot of the Arena Simulation 
model is given in Figure 1.  A brief 
description of the model logic is as 
follows:
1.Read input data for each 
scenario.
2.Generate 76 LAVs.
3.Generate part failures. (Five 
failure times are generated. 
Whichever is the smallest 
value is the next failure time 
of the LAV.)
4.The faulty part is removed 
from the LAV
5.Update FMC count (fully 
mission capable LAVs): FMC 
= FMC – 1
6.If a spare part is available, 
install a spare and reset the 
FMC count: FMC = FMC +1. 
Otherwise wait in the queue 
until a  spare is available from 
the spare pool until after Step 
8.  
7.The faulty part is sent to the 
repair facility.
8. After the delay as specified in the input, the 
repaired part joins the spare pool.
9. Repeat Steps #1 to #8 until the end of the 
simulation time.
10. At the end each of scenario, the simulation 
automatically calculates the operational availability: 
Ao = average FMC / total number of LAV.  FMC is 
a time-persistent variable (see e.g., Kelton et al. 
2010) and the average value of FMC must be “time-
averaged.”  Arena automatically computes the 
value.  
We run a total of 257 scenarios, each of which is 
simulated over a period of 1,000,000 hours and the first 
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Figure 2. A Screen Shot of NOLH Input Parameters (Columns A through M) 
and Output Results (Ao in Column N and the life cycle cost in Column O)
Figure 3. A Screen Shot of the LCC Computation Model
100,000 hours of observations were eliminated to remove 
initial bias.  900,000 hours of simulation is equivalent to 
approximately 7 replications of 20-year simulation. The 
average Ao (operational availability) from each scenario is 
automatically written onto the same input EXCEL spreadsheet 
worksheet (see Figure 2, Column N). 
Spreadsheet Model for Total Life Cycle Cost
The second model is the life cycle cost spreadsheet model 
that reads the same input scenarios (Table 2) and computes 
the total life cycle cost over the next 20 years.  The total life 
cycle in this model only includes operations and 
maintenance costs (spare, repair, transportation, and 
operations costs). See the sample screen shot in Figure 3. 
Our scenario includes 76  LAVs.  The operational tempo 
(Op Tempo or operating hours) changes during the design of 
experiments analysis.  We assume that the hourly operating 
cost to be $50, the hourly repair cost, $300, and the 
transportation cost, $200 per failure.  The annual capital 
discount rate of 7%, and the annual inventory rate of 20% are 
used.  The life cycle is assumed to be 20 years for the LAV. 
Any of these values can be modified by the user.  
We have developed a visual basic macro program to 
automate the life cycle cost computation for each of 257 
scenarios. Once the macro is executed, it reads the input 
parameters in each scenario (row by row) in Figure 2 then 
writes them on the highlighted cells on the spreadsheet life 
cycle cost model.  Once the spreadsheet model updates the 
total life cycle cost, the result (cell A35) is written onto the 
same input worksheet (Column O).  This procedure is 
repeated 257 times.  When the macro execution is complete, 
the life cycle cost results are on Column O, and the 
operational availability results from the simulation are in 
Column N, along with input parameters in Columns A 
through M. [see Figure 2.]  Then this worksheet is imported 
into the JMP® (SAS 2008) for further analysis.   
RESULTS
We begin assessing the output by looking at histograms of 
the simulation responses.  This can be a way of 
“accidentally” performing verification and validation of a 
simulation model.  Our results indicate that the average 
operational availability differs widely across the different 
scenarios, ranging from 0.573 to 0.995.  The average Ao 
across the 257 scenarios is 0.830 with a standard deviation of 
0.090. It appears that at least one of the input factors does, 
indeed, have a substantial influence on the system’s 
performance. [See Figure 4.]  
The average total life cycle cost across the 257 scenarios is 
$52.1 million with a standard deviation of $14.6 million.  The 
total life cycle cost also differs widely across the different 
scenarios, ranging from $19.9 million to $99.9 million.  It also 
indicates that at least one of the input factors does have a 
substantial influence on the total life cycle cost.  [See Figure 5.] 
The darkened areas of the Ao and cost distributions 
correspond to the subset of scenarios with lowest cost and 
highest Ao points, which will  be explained in Figure 10 at the 
end of this section. 
After confirming that the results appear reasonable, we 
turn to our main goals—identifying those factors and 
components that have the greatest impact on performance.  A 
useful non-parametric tool is a regression tree, as shown in 
Figure 6.  These graphics are effective for understanding and 
communicating the results of thousands of runs over many 
factors.  Regression trees are more human-readable and can 
be easier to describe than multiple regression models because 
they reveal the structure in the data in a simple way.  Initially, 
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Figure 4. Distribution of 
Operational Availability (Op Av)
Figure 5. Distribution of Total 
Life Cycle Cost
Figure 6. Regression Tree for the Average Ao
the data are grouped in a single cluster.  All  potential 
input factors are examined to identify how best to 
split them to yield two leaves so that the variability in 
the response within each leaf decreases and the 
variability in the response between the leaves 
increases.   
Figure 6 shows the regression tree for predicting 
the average Ao from the 257 simulation scenarios.  The 
dominant factor is clearly the operational tempo 
(Op_Temp). For example, the first split at the top 
indicates that the average Ao is 0.776 across the 104 
scenarios that have an operational tempo of 539 hours 
or more per year.  In contrast, the average Ao is 0.866 
(11.6% higher) among the 104 scenarios that had an 
operational tempo less than 539 hours per year.  As the 
operational tempo increases (i.e., more operating 
hours), the more failures occur and obviously the 
operational availability goes down.  In the second split 
when the operational tempo is greater than 539, the 
depot turnaround time (D-TAT) becomes a critical 
factor.  Then the failure rates (lambda 1 and lambda 3) 
of the laser sensor unit (Parts #1) and the driving 
differentials (Part #3) become critical.  
Regression trees are non-parametric approaches 
for fitting a statistical model to the simulation output. 
They can be good at identifying subsets of the output 
that behave much differently than the rest.  Regression 
metamodels can also be valuable.  They may confirm 
the regression tree results concerning which factor or 
factors have the greatest influence on the results, or 
they may allow more succinct descriptions of the simulation 
model’s performance if it can be well-described by simple 
polynomial metamodels.
Accordingly, we fit regression metamodels of the Ao as a 
function of main effects, and two-way interactions of the 13 
input factors. After noticing the impact of spare parts on 
readiness is not significant, we fit regression metamodels with 
8 input factors and two-way interactions (excluding spares 
from the main effects.) The sorted parameter estimates from 
the JMP analysis are shown in Figure 7 with R2 of 0.98 (not 
shown here), indicating that the regression metamodel does 
an excellent job of explaining the variability in the simulation 
output.  The results also confirm the observations made on the 
previously discussed regression tree.  
Because it can be difficult to look at a  regression equation 
and get a good sense of how the factors and interactions affect 
the response, interaction plots are often useful.  This 
interaction plot consists of several small subplots that indicate 
how the predicted performance (Ao) varies as a function of 
pairs of input factors.  After examining the interaction plots 
(not shown here), we do not see any major impact of 
interaction effects on the operational availability other than 
the interaction between lambda3 and I-TAT, implying that the 
impact of high failure rate of the driving differential (Part #3) 
is mitigated by small I-TAT. (Note that Part #3 is maintained 
at the I-level as previously discussed.) However, this 
interaction effect is not significant compared to the main 
effects.  Hence, we develop a simple linear model with 13 
main factors without interaction effects.  The results are 
shown in Figure 8 with R2 of 0.90, which might also be used 
to make inferences. The parameter estimates are shown in 
Table 5.  The large |t_ratio|s for the OP_Temp, lambda1, 
lambda3 and D-TAT show them to be the major factors, and 
agree with our regression tree results. Note that the numbers 
of spares are not as important as other factors.  This means 
that raising the spare levels from their lowest levels to the 
highest levels in Table 1 does not lead to appreciable 
improvement in the average operational availability.  
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Figure 7. Sorted Parameter Estimates from JMP Analysis
Figures 8.  Actual by Predicted Plot of 
Operational Availability (Linear Regression) 
Table 5. Parameter Estimates for Ao 
We use the same methodology to analyze the results from 
the total life cycle cost model.  We first observe the regression 
tree as shown in Figure 9.  Once again the dominant factor is 
the operational tempo (OP_Temp).  For example, the first split 
at the top indicates that the average life cycle cost is $63.5 
million across the 114 scenarios that had an operational tempo 
greater than or equal to 523 hours per year.  In contrast, the 
average life cycle cost is $43 million among the 143 scenarios 
that had an operational tempo less than 523 hours per year. 
As the operational tempo increases, the operating cost 
obviously increases, and this factor has more impact on the 
life cycle cost than any others.  In the second split, when the 
operational tempo is greater than 523, the reliability of the 
driving differential (Part #3) becomes a critical factor.  
We then develop regression metamodels with two-way 
interaction effects. After observing that not many interactions 
are significant, we build a simple linear regression model, and 
the results are shown in Table 6.  The R-square value is 0.98 
showing that this linear regression model does an excellent 
job of explaining the variability in the life cycle cost model. 
The results shown in Table 6 confirm that the operational 
tempo is the most critical factor followed by lambda3 and 
lambda1 (the failure rates of Part #3 and #1).    However, the 
repair turnaround times (I-TAT and D-TAT) do not affect 
much on the total life cycle cost. As the repair turnaround 
times increase, the operational availability deteriorates, yet the 
operations and maintenance cost will  not be affected. 
However, there is an implied waste of money since the repair 
pipeline inventory will go up as the repair turnaround time 
increases.  
The number of spares for Part #1 (the most expensive one 
among the five parts selected for analysis) seems to be more 
critical than other spares, yet the number of spares in general 
does not have much impact on the life cycle cost.  
Lastly, we compare Ao and total life cycle cost together in 
a scatterplot, given in Figure 10.  The darkened points 
correspond to those scenarios with lowest cost and highest 
Ao.  There is an obvious negative correlation between the two 
measures, with higher operational availability generally 
leading to lower overall  total life cycle cost.  In examining the 
input factor distributions for these selected points (not shown 
here), we find that the factor with the most explanatory power 
for achieving both lower cost and higher Ao together is 
operational tempo.  The next most driving influence for both 
measures considered together is the failure rate of Part # 3. 
These darkened points are also shown as the darkened areas 
in the distribution graphs of Figures 4 and 5.
 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates and a Summary of Fit for the Total 
Life Cycle Cost Model 
10 - IDFW 19 - Team 2
Figure 9. Regression Tree for the Total Life Cycle Cost
Figure 10. Scatterplot of Cost vs Ao
REMARKS
The most critical factor is the operational tempo for both Ao 
and the total life cycle cost. The more you operate, the more 
it fails and the more it costs. Then the reliability plays an 
important role.  Those parts with high failure rates are more 
critical (e.g., Part #1 and Part #3).  D-level turnaround times 
as well as I-level turnaround times are also critical factors for 
Ao. Those with longer repair turnaround times [e.g., Part #1 
fails less often than Part #3, yet its repair turnaround time is 
much longer (D-level maintenance) than that of Part #3 (I-
level maintenance)] tend to be more critical for Ao.  The 
repair turnaround times do not have much direct impact on 
the total life cycle cost, since, in the life cycle spreadsheet 
model, the spare level for each component was 
predetermined for each scenario.  However, in reality if the 
repair turnaround time gets longer, managers tend to 
purchase more spares to improve readiness, yet those newly 
acquired spares will only spike the operational availability 
for a  short term.  Eventually those newly acquired spares 
will fail and get stuck in the repair pipeline without 
improving Ao in the long run if the repair turnaround time is 
not reduced.  
In conclusion, both warfighters and financial  managers 
should understand the importance of logistics and impact of 
reliability, cycle time and operational tempo on readiness and 
life cycle cost.  
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INTRODUCTION
The Bundeswehr Transformation Center is examining how 
M&S can effectively support CD&E projects related to Peace 
Support Operations (PSO). Human Factors and Human 
Behavior analyses have proven to be highly relevant in this 
context. One study specifically examines possibilities to 
model scenarios in a PSO with PAX in which the military is 
tasked to assist in building and operating refugee camps, 
and especially to ensure order and security. PAX is planned 
to be used to support decision makers in assessing and 
evaluating ROE (Rules of Engagements) applying the basic 
use of force guidelines for the soldier in PSO missions.
Questions
The model of evolving aggressiveness within groups which 
is modeled in PAX is quite complex (a subsumption can be 
found in [1]).
Therefore, one major object of investigation for the team 
was which input parameters that determine the group's 
behavioral characteristics lead to escalating and particularly 
dangerous, i.e. violent situations. This question will be stated 
more precisely when looking at the specific scenario and 
studies later on. However, since there are a lot of factors 
actually characterizing the behavior of human agents with 
regard to their  emotional states and evolvement of aggression, 
statistical means will be used to examine those factors and 
their interrelationship in our studies.
At IDFW18, PAX was calibrated in specific micro 
scenarios within a refugee camp scenario modeled in the 3-
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Figure 1: Refugee Camp Base Scenario
dimensional environment of PAX. Special focus was on 
calibrating the soldiers' behavioral model in detail, which had 
been adopted to represent a  realistic self defense behavior of 
the soldier agents according to commonly applied use of force 
guidelines.
Having found that the soldiers' self defense behavior is 
carried out correctly and in a sufficiently realistic way in the 
micro scenarios with very few agents, the team's second 
objective during IDFW19 was to find out whether this soldier 
behavior also works properly in larger ("macro") scenarios.
To summarize, the driving questions for investigation for 
the week were:
• Which group characteristics lead to escalating and 
dangerous situations?  Which input factors and 
combinations thereof are most influential?
• Does the new soldier behavior that was validated 
during IDFW18 in micro scenarios also work properly 
in larger scenarios?
Scenario
Figure 1 depicts the general refugee camp scenario that was 
used as the baseline for the week's studies in its 
implementation using the current PAX3D version. The 
scenario is set up to be at around noon time at the time when 
food distribution at the central distribution point has just 
started and representatives of each tent are in the area 
marked as Food Distribution to collect the respective tent's 
packages.
Meanwhile, the rest of the refugees are waiting in their 
tents for the tent representatives to bring back and distribute 
the food. While this is their main motivation, there is also a 
certain tension between the two rivaling groups marked as 
Group A and Group B with 40 refugees each. Besides the 
"normal" civilians, each group encloses 2 disturbers, initially 
aggressive and equipped with weapons. A soldier patrol is set 
up in the tent area to prevent or dissolve trouble amongst the 
refugees.
STUDIES & ANALYSIS
To address our questions and in particular to examine the 
most influential factor combinations for certain group 
characteristics and scenario developments, we started off 
with a Data Farming experiment in which we varied the 
parameters characterizing the dynamics of PAX with regard 
to the agents' emotional states.
Experiment 1 Setup
While the complete design in terms of the varied range of 
each factor is shown in Table 1, it is important to briefly 
introduce the meaning of the parameters, at least to an extent 
which will support the following analysis:
A civilian's anger factor (denoted by PC_ANGER in the 
following) determines the dynamics of the anger of an agent. 
A low anger factor results in an angry agent staying angry for 
a long time, thus characterizing – in combination with other 
model inputs – a rather hot-tempered civilian.
Table 1: Basis of NOLH design of experiment
Likewise, a low fear factor (PC_FEAR) of a civilian 
characterizes a rather anxious personality.
A similar correlation exists for the readiness for 
aggression (RFA) and the arousal of the agents, respectively.
The soldiers' sensor range determines the range in which 
the soldiers react to interactions, representing a very basic 
notion of a "sensor".
Finally we varied some internal thresholds for classifying 
anger and readiness for aggression as high and very high, 
respectively, during a simulation run. They are displayed in 
the table but will not be examined further.
Experiment 1 Analysis
When examining this first NOLH experiment, one much 
unexpected observation was that in some of the runs a very 
high number of civilians (up to a maximum of 19) were 
actually killed (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Distribution of number of killed civilians in NOLH 
design experiment
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Although this was a surprise at first, this outcome 
actually helped the team tremendously in answering our first 
question. We noticed that the very diverse spectrum of 
scenario outcomes was mainly due to the wide ranges in 
which we had varied our model factors. As we had done so 
intentionally in order to identify which factor ranges and their 
combinations caused different types of group behavior, we 
now took a closer look at the combinations that caused this 
high level of aggression.
Figure 3: Regression tree analysis of MOE "At least one civilian 
killed"
A regression tree analysis showed that the combination of 
the PC_ANGER and the PC_FEAR parameters is a key factor 
for the violence observed in the scenario. For example, Figure 
3 shows that a  rather low anger factor (meaning the agents 
stay rather angry) combined with a  high fear factor (meaning 
that the agents are rather "fearless") is a key influence for at 
least one civilian being killed.
Figure 4: Allocation of moderate  violent civilian personality 
characteristics (green = 0 kills to red = 19 kills)
In other words, we can conclude that a  combination of an 
anger factor below 0.08 and a fear factor above 0.08 leads to 
the agents behaving very aggressively in this scenario. On the 
other hand, we found that with an anger factor above 0.08 and 
a fear factor below 0.3 very few incidents with killed civilians 
happen. Figure 4 displays these cross-effects graphically, 
although these results will have to be confirmed by follow-up 
experiments.
One can further interpret Figure 4 concluding that the 
remaining parts of the parameter space characterize medium 
or normal aggression levels of the respective civilians once 
more thorough investigation of the two determining factors 
has been done.
As to the team's second question we identified a 
remaining flaw in the implementation which in our scenario 
setup caused the soldiers not to react strongly enough as long 
as other civilians were beaten, but not attacked with any 
weapons. Especially in the very violent scenarios this had the 
effect of aggressors continuously beating members of the 
other group, unimpressed by the soldiers' continuous 
attempts to resolve the situation.1
Experiment 2 Setup
In a follow-up experiment we re-ran the same experimental 
design with a slightly changed base case scenario in which in 
addition to the disturbers 5 randomly selected "normal" 
members of each civilian group were equipped with 
weapons. The team hoped that this would lead to the 
soldiers recognizing the life-threatening situation, solving 
the arising conflicts.
Figure 5: Team expectations in second experiment
The team's expectations as to the outcome of this scenario 
are summarized in Figure 5, together with a  first overview of 
the results of the analysis. The figure shows that the team 
expected fewer civilians to be killed in the second experiment, 
which is an intuitive expectation when considering the 
aforementioned reason for setting up the second experiment 
with more weapons.
Experiment 2 Analysis
Two of our expectations were met in the experiment 
analysis: The civilians' carrying more weapons did actually 
lead to more of them being arrested and there were more 
runs with at least one civilian killed.
However, the fact that the soldiers now consequently 
performed their self-defense behavior and arrested disturbers 
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1 The soldiers' behavior is not introduced here, but a description can be found in [2].
did not in turn lead to fewer civilians killed in general. We 
noticed that the effect of more extreme attacks happening 
outweighed the soldiers' stepping in more thoroughly.
The comparison of the contour plots of the experiments 
with (Figure 6) and without weapons clearly confirms this 
observation. Also, in the "medium-range" area (upper right) 
we can see more severe and violent simulation runs than in 
experiment 1 – an effect of the higher number of weapons 
being used by the civilians.
Figure 6: Influence of PC_ANGER and PC_FEAR in 2nd 
experiment (green = 0 kills, red = 20 kills)
Thus in essence the rough parameter ranges of 
PC_ANGER x PC_FEAR that we had identified in the first 
experiment were confirmed to hold in the vignette with 
weapons as well.
We conclude that we have made a step forward in 
understanding the complex dynamics of the model and 
finding parameter ranges that allow us to model different 
group characteristics.
On the other hand, the soldiers' inability to control the 
situation in the violent scenarios shows the necessity to make 
the soldiers' behavior suitable also for larger scenarios with 
many incidents happening at the same time. This will require 
some coordination within and between different soldier 
groups and their respective leaders, not yet implemented in 
PAX, as well as a slightly enhanced vulnerability model 
allowing for the soldiers to better  assess the harm that an 
aggressive action implies to the victim.
CONCLUSION
With regard to our goal of determining relevant factors for 
modeling different group characteristics in PAX3D we have 
found through our experiments that we are able to model a 
wide variety of different scenarios – from very peaceful 
scenarios to very violent ones.
Furthermore, we were able to identify distinct 
combinations of some of the PAX3D personality constants, 
among them especially the anger and fear personality 
constants, leading to extreme scenarios with regard to 
violence.
In follow-up experiments we will examine these 
parameter combinations in more depth with the goal of 
eventually being able to predefine specific agent templates 
with respect to the agent's or group behavioral characteristics 
– for example very violent and aggressive, moderate or 
peaceful civilians and groups. These "soft" attributes, while 
intuitive to the human reader (at first), are generally not easy 
to transfer into the hard technical variables of a simulation 
model. Therefore, we consider the work of IDFW19 a major 
step forward in this direction.
As a side effect of our studies during the week, it has 
once again become evident that in accordance with the 
question-based paradigm of the Data Farming concept a 
simulation model is and has to be built to answer specific 
questions. In our case, we conclude that when in the course of 
the scenario the situation turns into a combat-like situation, a 
model other than PAX3D might be better suited to represent 
this new situation, focusing on the combat aspects in addition 
to the social aspects of the scenario.
The Bundeswehr Transformation Center is currently 
investigating how far functionalities of combat-oriented 
models can be introduced into PAX to enhance the model in 
this direction, and to identify the cutting point where a 
scenario really requires a different model. Furthermore, in an 
operational synthesis approach as investigated by our team 
during IDFW16, PAX and more combat-oriented models 
could eventually complement each other in these types of 
scenarios.
In terms of further calibration of the model and scenario 
we found that the soldiers' behavior, while working well in 
small-scale ("micro") scenarios, needs to be further adapted for 
macro scenarios where many incidents happen at the same 
time. A basic notion of coordination between the different 
soldier patrols and their leaders, in our case, is seen as the 
foremost necessity for modeling this type of scenarios in order 
to retain a more realistic and sensible soldier behavior.
The results of IDFW 18 could be proven practically 
feasible for model calibration. The distinction of the model 
factors into three categories (see [2]) makes the calibration 
process more targeted: Internal factors are the "deepest" in the 
model and are to be calibrated to fixed values, ideally never 
touched again. Advanced factors are calibrated to fixed values 
or ranges, but the values depend on the scenario and thus 
requiring recalibration when the scenario changes. The 
variable factors finally represent the parameters available to 
the OR analyst and should be calibrated to reasonable ranges 
to achieve model feasibility depending on the scenario being 
analyzed. This categorization is considered essential for future 
calibration work.
To summarize, we have shown that to some extent we 
can classify the civilian group characteristics into rough 
templates and have identified parameter ranges for each 
template – moderate to highly aggressive – which will have 
to be narrowed down and divided further in the future. 
Beyond that, the soldiers in PAX will need additional abilities, 
such as coordination of squads or more realistic sensing and a 
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situational awareness, which have both shown to be essential 
in larger scenarios.
Finally, the interdisciplinary, international and 
collaborative atmosphere during IDFW19 again guaranteed 
great work with valuable results! Special thanks to all  team 
members for bringing in their expertise, work and time, and 
fun during the week – with one word: their MANA!
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The development of the agent-based sensor and effector 
model ABSEM was started in 2008 by EADS on behalf of the 
German Federal Office of Defence Technology and 
Procurement. Since then it has been continuously enhanced 
and at IDFW19 version 0.3 was released. The model 
concentrates on modeling complex technical aspects in NCO 
and to do so, it integrates detailed physical theories when it 
comes to simulating the output of various sensors and when 
determining the effect of different weapon systems. The new 
model version is characterized by more sophisticated 
effector modeling and extended possibilities regarding the 
setup of the agents' behavior. Furthermore it contains a first 
radar model implementation. 
During IDFW19 a camp protection scenario was used to 
perform extensive data farming experiments and thus 
improve system understanding.
Objectives
Using a camp protection scenario, the team's objective is to 
investigate the effect of different sensor systems (electro-
optical and radar) and effector types (direct / indirect fire, 
weapons with point and area effect) within a dynamic 
environment.  Particularly the new ABSEM version 0.3 
features were to be reviewed. This included on the one hand 
verifying the integrated model approaches and on the other 
hand exploring the model's possibilities when it comes to 
simulating more complex NCO scenarios. The new features 
are:
• Radar systems for airborne reconnaissance
• Larger terrain cell (400*400km), urban environment
• IEDs, indirect fire, weapons with area effect
• Extended state dependent 
agents' behavior state machine
• Trigger events
In Data Farming experiments the team's main intention 
is to examine the effect of the given sensor and effector 
systems under varying conditions, such as different weather-
dependent atmospheric conditions, time of day, varying 
number and type of blue and red units,…). 
Overall, the team has the following goals:
• Review and face validate ABSEM version 0.3
• Validate the implemented radar model
• Setup a  complex scenario
• Conduct data farming experiments analyzing the 
effect of parameters such as different sensor systems, 
number of deployed blue forces, reaction times,…
• Find out further model and data farming requirements
Simple scenario for testing the radar 
model's plausibility
A new radar model has been implemented for the new 
ABSEM version 0.3. At this workshop a first simple radar 
scenario was simulated to investigate and validate the 
correct modeling of monostatic pulsed radar systems in 
ABSEM.
Figure 1: Simple radar test scenario
In the scenario shown in figure 1, an aircraft is 
approaching an air surveillance radar starting at a distance of 
around 90 kilometers.
The detection distance was used as the MOE to measure 
the radar performance for different radar types, weather 
conditions and target sizes and types.
The implemented radar model considers the following 
parameters: 
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First, a wide range of technical radar parameters may be 
defined and used to simulate the radar performance in the 
radar model.
Second, the environment is taken into account (e.g. line of 
sight or atmospheric losses due to rain).
And finally target parameters like the Radar Cross 
Section (RCS) and the Swerling Case, which defines the 
fluctuation of the RCS is taken into account in the radar 
model.
Figure 2: Detection distance for different RCS values for low (left) 
and high (right) frequency radars
Overall we could verify the radar model's correctness. 
The performed data experiments confirmed the expected 
behavior. 
We could for instance observe that radars with higher 
frequencies are more robust against RCS-fluctuations (see 
figure 2) or technical radar losses (see figure 3). Lower 
frequency radars, however, perform better when it's very 
rainy. When looking at the regression tree we found out that 
besides the RCS value (which only depends on the target) the 
pulse compression and technical radar losses have the most 
influence on the radar performance.
Figure 3: Detection distance for different typical radar losses for 
low (left) and high (right) frequency radar.
More complex NCO Scenario
The extended model functionalities regarding both the 
implemented effector model and the enhanced agent 
behavior were tested using a camp protection scenario. 
Scenario Description
The military camp is located outside Mazar-e-Sharif and 
faces a constant threat by local insurgents. Once in a while 
the camp is attacked by mortar grenades mostly fired from 
the inner city. For this reason patrols through Mazar-e-Sharif 
are trying to detect and defeat any hostile firing positions. In 
addition UAVs are deployed for aerial surveillance to 
reconnoiter the attackers. All the reconnaissance information 
is passed on to the camp's headquarters. 
In case a hostile mortar firing position was identified, all 
soldiers within the camp will be warned which causes them to 
retreat into secure shelters. Additionally the patrols will get 
the order to fight the insurgents. This implies that the blue 
patrol will quit its predetermined patrol  route and follow or 
move towards the red insurgents. Those, however, have 
planned to perform a hit and run ambush by using an IED 
and attacking the patrol with rifles and rocket propelled 
grenades as soon as one of the patrol's vehicles was damaged 
by the IED and therefore the whole patrol was halted.
Figure 4: Overall scenario from the bird's eye view
Data Farming Experiments
We were executing a series of data farming experiments, 
looking at the following parameters:
• number of deployed UAVs for airborne 
reconnaissance: {0;1;2}
• deployment of a second vehicle patrol: yes/no
• time of the day: noon / midnight
• weather: foggy / clear
• type of sensor system used by blue forces: normal 
viewing during day and night / long wave infrared 
device
As MoEs we were mainly looking at the damage state of 
the blue forces, differing between the losses within and those 
outside the camp.
All of our experiments were successfully executed on the 
32-node German cluster owned by BWB. 
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In an iterative approach we were executing several data 
farming experiments to analyze the mentioned parameters' 
influence on the overall mission success, i.e. avoiding blue 
losses. The final experiment encompassed more than 5000 
simulation runs, successfully executed in several hours on the 
32-node German cluster owned by the German Procurement 
Office.
Data Farming Results
We found out that in this scenario setup the deployment of 
UAVs is essential  for the camp protection, whereas the 
convoy patrols are not sufficient.
An interesting effect, however, can be seen in figure 5. 
Whereas the UAVs help a lot regarding the protection of the 
soldiers within the camp, it also leads to more losses in the 
convoy. The reason for that is that as soon as the red forces 
were identified by the UAV, the blue patrols will try to fight 
and follow the red forces. Unfortunately that's exactly what 
the red forces were trying to achieve and helps them 
ambushing the patrol. Thus, if the red forces were not 
detected, the patrol won't be involved in any fight.
Furthermore we could observe that actually the time at 
which the red mortar starts firing at the military camp is quite 
significant. However, this is a  factor that cannot be influenced 
in reality. Therefore we were interested to find out which of 
the other parameters mostly affects the number of blue 
damages. To do so we generated a partition tree that showed 
that the number of deployed UAVs has the largest impact, 
followed by the type of sensor applied.
But it was also seen that apparently in an urban environment 
the deployment of highly developed sensor systems is not 
that important since the target needs to be very close 
anyway in order to be detected.
SUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD
The implemented radar model delivered very plausible 
results, thus showing us that we are on the right track.
Figure 5: Influence of the UAV deployment 
on the number of blue losses
With ABSEM version 0.3 and the provided model features 
we are now able to set up more complex scenarios within a 
short amount of  time.  
Of course, the more complex the scenario and the longer the 
period of time we are looking at, the longer the execution 
times of the simulation runs. Therefore in future we will 
have to think about using more sophisticated experiment 
designs than just using the gridded design. In ABSEM, 
however, for the current set of analyzed scenarios we need to 
have the possibility to lockstep several parameters (for 
instance to model a convoy existing of several entities). 
Therefore we need to find a possibility for both using the 
NOLH design but still being able to lockstep. Additionally 
we derived the need for further user interfaces simplifying 
the whole scenario setup and the agents' behavior 
parameterization in particular.
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INTRODUCTION
ITSim is a general purpose simulation system for decision-
support. It focuses on the simulation of coherent processes 
and provides additional methods for examining 
optimization tasks within the broader range of tasks of the 
German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr. Modern warfare 
scenarios are dominated by asymmetric threats with 
complex non-linear interdependencies and interrelations 
that traditional techniques of analysis are insufficient to 
capture. For example, it is often hard to determine whether 
located humans are opponents (red) or just civilians 
(neutral). We use a base protection scenario and evaluate 
several active defense options against small teams firing 
improvised ballistic rockets at the camp. Based on the 
scenario introduced at the International Data Farming 
Workshop 18 (IDFW18) [1], the Force-Protection domain is 
enhanced to investigate further issues.
The investigated scenario analyzes exactly that aspect by 
using 3D terrain augmented with semantic information 
provided by the German Armed Forces. The data is not 
modeled but imported from an official data source. During 
this workshop, we wanted to answer two questions: 
1. Does the consideration of semantic information (see 
below) result in a statistically significant change of 
the investigated Measure of Effectiveness (MoE)? 
Note that the consideration of semantic information 
will result in a more realistic environment model. 
But this more precise model raises costs in 
computation and modelling time. If the MoE is not 
affected by this additional effort, we can omit 
semantic information for this scenario.
2. Does an optimization of blue emplacements in 
order to increase the observed area (see below) 
result in a statistically significant improvement of 
blue’s success w.r.t. the investigated MoE?
Of course, we expect the answer to this question to be 
true. It is interesting to investigate the importance of the 
optimization criterion w.r.t. the investigated MoE. If the 
criterion is not important, the MoE will not be affected. In 
future, we are interested in performing several optimizations 
according to several criteria in order to determine the most 
important ones.
Figure 1: Base in 3D terrain with semantic information
SCENARIO
Figure 1 depicts the investigated scenario. A blue base is 
located in 3D terrain with additional semantic information. 
Dark regions mark high terrain elevation whereas bright 
areas denote lower terrain. Thus, the blue base is located on 
a hill. The semantic information is attached directly to the 
terrain data. Basically, it is a classification of the terrain, 
including rivers, buildings, different types of wood, different 
types of streets and flat terrain. In figure 1, woods are 
visualized as green areas and plain terrain is depicted in 
yellow. Additionally, the dark roadmap and the blue river 
can be recognized. In the lower right part of figure 1, many 
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buildings colored in red are visible. Two towers equipped 
with cameras are used to observe the surrounding area of 
the camp. They are visualized by tactical icons in the upper 
part of figure 1. During the course of the scenario, some Red 
will approach the base in order to attack it with ballistic 
weapons. 
The key idea is that the opponents cannot be detected as 
Red until they start to prepare their attack. Thus, the whole 
approach time cannot be used to prevent the attack. After the 
configured preparation time, the opponents launch n missiles 
(with reload time in between) and flee afterwards.
The scenario’s analysis is divided into two phases. The 
first one is a static classification and the second one is a 
simulation capturing the dynamics of the strategies.
Static Classification
Before the scenario is simulated dynamically, a static 
classification is performed. Two important measures are vital 
for the strategies: Ballistic threat and line-of-sight. Areas 
from which the base can be attacked by ballistic weapons are 
called ballistically threatening. The muzzle velocity of the 
weapon defines its maximal distance. The terrain defines if 
there is an angle that results in a flight trajectory such that 
the base can potentially be hit. Considering the semantic 
information, we defined that it is impossible to attack 
ballistically from rivers, buildings and woods. Thus, the 
ballistic threat strongly depends on the given terrain and 
semantic augmentation. The line-of-sight denotes which 
areas can be observed by the cameras in the base. These cells 
are called observable.
In order to perform the classification, the area around the 
base is gridded. Afterwards, every cell, i.e. grid element, is 
checked if it is ballistically threatening and observable. Note 
that the terrain itself is not gridded but based on precise 
vector data. According to that classification, three cases exist:  
• Green: A cell  is not ballistically threatening, i.e. the 
base cannot be attacked from that cell. The Blue don’t 
have to worry about that cell. Therefore, the cell  is 
colored green.
• Yellow: A cell is ballistically threatening and 
observable. Thus, the base can be attacked from that 
cell and there is a  line-of-sight to the Blue. The 
attackers can be detected while they prepare their 
attack. The cell is colored yellow.
• Red: A cell is ballistically threatening and not 
observable. Thus, the base can be attacked from that 
cell and there is no line-of-sight to the base. The 
attackers cannot be identified while they prepare their 
attack. This is the worst case for the blue forces and 
the cell is colored red.
If the semantic information is taken into account in the 
grid classification, the ballistic reachability is restricted by not 
allowing shots from woods, rivers and buildings. This 
reduces the opponent’s area of operation. This might have an 
effect on the optimization, because a smaller  area needs to be 
monitored. Thus, fewer emplacements might be needed in 
order to establish a certain success for Blue.  The result of this 
classification is depicted in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows 
the classification with considering the semantic information, 
figure 3 without. Considering the semantics changes the 
number of green, i.e. not ballistically threatening, cells from 
21.8% to 48.2%. Thus, roughly 26.4 percent of the cells are not 
longer threatening for Blue. This consideration of ballistic 
semantics results in a limitation for Red’s area of operation. 
By comparing figures 1, 2 and 3, we can recognize that the 
woods (depicted green in figure 1) are ballistically 
threatening in figure 3 (classification without semantics) but 
are not in figure 2 (classification with semantics). The same 
holds for the river, which can be recognized in figure 2. Note 
that when considering a higher grid resolution, i.e. smaller 
grid cells, the whole calculation gets more accurate and the 
river can be recognized more clearly.
Figure 2: Result of classification considering semantics
Figure 3: Classification without considering semantics
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Simulation of the Strategies
In order to be able to compare the semantics impact on 
Blue’s success, several strategies have been evaluated against 
a given red behavior. This kind of analysis may give 
interesting hints to support the defending of the base. The 
red strategy is fixed in all experiments. It consists of the 
following steps: 
• Generation: The units are generated uniformly 
distributed outside the base. Their affiliation is 
neutral, i.e. they cannot be detected as hostile.
• Approach: A yellow or red cell (i.e. a ballistic attack is 
possible from that cell) is selected and moved to. The 
unit is still not detectable as hostile.
• Preparation: Two cases exist. If the attacker can detect 
any blue unit it gets discouraged and flees. Otherwise 
it starts to prepare its attack. From that point in time, it 
can be detected as hostile by Blue. As soon as the blue 
force is detected by the red unit, the Red aborts its 
preparation and flees. Note that the cameras’ sight 
range is much higher than the one for regular ground 
troops including red attackers and blue defenders. 
• Attack: The Red starts to fire a previously defined 
number of projectiles (intended shot number) at the 
base. From this point in time, the attacker is detected 
as hostile by the blue defenders if it has not already 
been. Between the shots, the attacker has to reload. 
Afterwards, it flees.
Currently, Blue has three different strategy options to 
prevent ballistic bombardment at the base:
1. Pursue  from Base (PfB): A blue Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) is located inside the base and pursues the red 
attackers as soon as they have been detected. The 
attacker can be observed by the cameras or they 
reveal themselves by shooting projectiles at the 
base.
2. Camouflaged Emplacements  (CE): Camouflaged 
spotters are located outside the base. They can 
detect the Red but not vice versa. As soon as the red 
units are located, their position is reported to the 
base and the QRF starts the counterattack at the 
Red.
3. Show of Forces (SoF): Patrols move around the base. 
They can detect the Red and can also be detected by 
these. If any red force is located, the nearest patrol 
starts a counter attack. Note that there is no QRF in 
the base as in the other strategies. A red opponent 
detecting an approaching patrol is going to flee.
The semantic attributes influence the routing of the units. 
According to the different road types, a restriction to the top-
speed along the roads is modeled. Thus, Blue’s as well as 
Red’s speed will be reduced on certain routes. One might 
expect less success for Blue, but this is not clear since both 
parties drive slower. 
As a MoE we used the percentage of PreventedShots, 
defined as the ratio of prevented shots with respect to the 
number of intended shots. For example, if the red attacker 
intended to shoot two times and has been neutralized after 
one shot, PreventedShots is 0.5. Additionally, we measured 
the following MoEs, which are not further regarded in this 
report due to space limitations:
• PreventedShots: The number of prevented shots at the 
base. This happens if the attacker is neutralized or 
discouraged before the attack is started. 
• PreventedAllShots: This binary MoE is true, when all 
intended shots have been prevented.
• NeutralizedAttacker: The number of neutralized 
attackers. 
Figure 4: Classification with 3 active emplacements considering 
ballistic semantics
Figure 5: Classification with 3 active emplacements without 
considering semantics
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In order to distribute the emplacements in the CE 
vignette, an optimization feature is used. The user has to 
define several possible positions and ITSim distributes up to n 
spotters over these possible positions. Figures 4 and 5 depict 
the possible emplacement position, the green icons. The 
visibility of the 3 active emplacements (the larger icons) is 
currently considered in the classification. 
Figure 4 shows the optimal distribution of 3 
emplacements considering the ballistic semantics and figure 5 
shows the same distribution on a  grid without considering 
ballistic semantics. The green cells remain unchanged as can 
be seen by a comparison of figure 4 and 5 with 2 and 3, 
respectively. Considering the semantics, the number of green 
cells is 18,144 of 37,638, i.e. 48.21 percent. When omitting the 
semantics, we only have 8,209 corresponding to a percentage 
of 21.81. The optimization maximizes the number of yellow 
cells with constant green ones. Thus, the optimization 
criterion is the number of yellow cells divided by the sum of 
red and yellow cells. 
Figure 6: Percentage of yellow cells
Figure 6 shows this measure for the best and worst 
distribution of 0 up to 19 emplacements with and without 
considering semantics. The typical logarithmic shaped curve 
indicates that saturation is reached. The best distributions are 
much better than the worst ones if the number of possible 
decisions is sufficiently high. Note that the 0- and 19-
distribution are exactly the same in the worst and best 
optimization since no decision can be made. Running the 
optimization on the grid considering ballistic semantics gives 
better results if at least six emplacements are distributed than 
the optimization results on the non-semantic one. The 
advantage of considering the semantics is because of the 
restricted operational area for Red. Note that the non-semantic 
grid is superior without any spotters being distributed. The 
reason for this is that most cells getting green are also visible 
by the watch towers. In eight of nineteen distributions, the 
result is different. 
In SoF, the QRF is not waiting in the base but patrolling in 
the valley as depicted in figure 7. The blue line is its current 
route. The red attacker in the upper part of figure 7 is 
currently approaching its improvised fire position. In this 
case, a QRF positioned in the base would probably perform 
better. Note that the camera towers inside the base always 
support the detection of the Red. As mentioned above, the red 
units can only be detected after they have started preparing 
their attack. The QRF has limited time to reach the attackers 
before they can fire their rockets.
Figure 7: Running simulation of SoF
Although we defined three different strategy options for 
the blue forces, we are not interested in comparing these. As 
already stated in the introduction, we want to evaluate the 
influence of the additional semantic information as well as 
the optimization feature. Basically, PfB is a sub-strategy of CE 
(with no emplacements) as well  as SoF with only one patrol 
staying in the base. In the following, we want to use all 
strategies to evaluate the semantics’ influence on the MoE. 
With the CE strategies, we want to determine the impact of 
the optimization feature.
Factor Min Max Unit
Speed QRF 20 75 km/h
Speed Red 20 75 km/h
Height Red 1.5 3.0 m
Setup Time Red 2 10 min
Reload Time Red 1 3 min
Mean Detection Time Camera 1 3 min
Mean Detection Time Emplacements 1 3 min
Intended Shots Red 1 3
Table 1: NOLH design
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We used a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) [2] 
design with 65 design points for our experiments and 
crossed it with the two kinds of semantics. Thus, all 
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experiments have been run on the grid depicted in figures 2 
and 3, with and without considering the semantics for the 
ballistic reachability, respectively. Additionally, we ran all 
scenarios by using the semantic routing or not. By using it, 
the routing algorithm is aware of the top-speed restriction on 
the roads. The NOLH design (see table 1) consists of the 
following parameters: Speed of blue QRF, mean time of 
detection of the cameras on the watch towers in the blue 
base, the mean time of detection of the blue emplacements, 
the speed of the red attackers, the height of Red, Red’s setup 
time (the time needed to build up its ballistic weapon), the 
reload time of Red and the number of intended shots at the 
base. For each design point 50 replications are conducted 
with different seeds. In total 13,000 simulation runs for each 
scenario are performed. Altogether, we modeled 8 scenarios, 
i.e. one PfB, one SoF and six CE scenarios. The latter 
scenarios were calculated with 1, 3 and 5 spotters, 
distributed according to best and worst optimization results, 
respectively. Thus, we performed 104,000 simulation runs.
As mentioned above, we wanted to examine the impact 
of considering the semantics as well as performing the 
optimization on blue’s success, i.e. the MoE PreventedShots. 
Additionally, we compare Blue’s strategies very briefly.
Impact of Optimization
The optimization result depends on the ballistic specific 
interpretation of the semantics. If the information is 
considered, different distributions are calculated as already 
mentioned above and can be seen in figure 6. For simplicity, 
we only used the results of the grid considering the 
semantics and evaluated this distribution with both grids, 
i.e. the semantic and non-semantic one. We distributed one, 
three and five emplacements according to the best and worst 
optimization result. Tables 2 and 3  show the results. Note 
that 0  observers correspond to the PfB strategy serving as 
baseline. The worst distribution of observers made the MoE 
PreventedShots even worse. 
# observer Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
0
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
1
mean 0.359 Mean 0.264
std-dev 0.442 std-dev 0.405
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
3
mean 0.470 mean 0.360
std-dev 0.468 std-dev 0.441
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.005
5
mean 0.561 mean 0.446
std-dev 0.463 std-dev 0.462
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.006
Table 2: “Best” optimization of CE
In most cases, the best distribution outperformed the 
worst one significantly. Only the non-ballistic grid with one 
emplacement is an outlier. The reason therefore is that the 
optimization has been performed considering ballistic 
semantics but the simulation has not. Thus, the optimization 
criterion does not match the simulated reality. This artifact is 
a hint that the model of the optimization is not accurate 
enough and is a great indication that accurate and correct 
models must be used during optimization and simulation in 
order to get robust results. Thus, we claim that our 
optimization according to the visibility of the spotters 
improves Blue’s statistically significant.
# observer Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
0
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
1
mean 0.316 mean 0.288
std-dev 0.428 std-dev 0.416
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
3
mean 0.235 mean 0.219
std-dev 0.389 std-dev 0.375
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
5
mean 0.203 mean 0.241
std-dev 0.374 std-dev 0.390
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.005
Table 3: “Worst” optimization of CE
Impact of Semantics
“Does considering the semantics have an impact on Blue’s 
success?” - “It depends.”
The impact of the semantic information is different 
according to the different effects. We modeled two effects: The 
impact on the ballistic reachability as well as the impact on the 
semantic routing referred to as ballistic semantics and road 
semantics, respectively. 
Strategy Ballistic Semantics No Ballistic Semantics
PfB
mean 0.331 mean 0.205
std-dev 0.435 std-dev 0.362
std-err 0.005 std-err 0.004
SoF
mean 0.532 mean 0.536
std-dev 0.463 std-dev 0.471
std-err 0.006 std-err 0.006
Table 4: PreventedShots of PfB and SoF
The impact of the ballistic semantics can be read off 
tables 2, 3  and 4 for the different strategies. Especially with 
CE, a significant effect can be seen, since in all cases, Blue’s 
success raises when ballistic semantics has been considered 
during simulation. The main reason therefore is that the 
semantics has been considered during the optimization step. 
For the baseline PfB, the impact is also significant. The reason 
therefore is that many cells that are green, i.e. not ballistically 
threatening, only if the semantic is considered are located far 
away from the base (cf. figures 2 and 3). These cells cannot be 
reached by the QRF in time with high probability. Thus, Red 
can launch more attacks if the ballistic semantics is not 
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considered. Using strategy SoF Blue performs not significantly 
different in comparison to the scenario without semantics. 
The reason is that the patrol route (cf. figure 7) is located in an 
area where many cells are ballistically threatening only if the 
semantics are not considered. Thus, Red attackers appear 
near the patrol route very likely and are neutralized with 
high probability. Thereby note that the patrol route has not 
been optimized but chosen quite arbitrarily by the user. 
Summarizing the ballistic semantics’ effects, we claim that the 
impact is strongly related to the blue strategies and the 
amount of knowledge that has been used for their 
optimization. It is important that this optimization must 
consider the same semantic information as the simulation 
does. The reason for PfB to perform better without semantics 
and SoF to perform the same is random: The SoF patrol route 
has been chosen luckily and the far cells that are very unlikely 
to be reached in time from the base are not ballistically 
threatening when considering the semantics. But it is very 
important to have an accurate model in order to influence the 
strategy by optimization and simulation.
The answer to the second question is different. In all 
scenarios, the road semantics had no significant effect. For 
brevity, we do not show any results. We think the main reason 
was a realistic top-speed restriction on the road. Additionally, 
this restriction holds for red as well as for blue forces. Since 
both units had quite similar speeds (cf. table 1), they were 
restricted similarly on the roads and no influence of the 
success could be determined statistically. The road semantics 
might get interesting if it is considered for the setup of the 
strategy, e.g. during an optimization of patrol routes.
Comparison of Blue Strategies
During IDFW18, we also compared the different strategy 
options itself. Although this comparison was not our aim at 
this workshop, we can compare the strategies with tables 2, 3 
and 4. Note that PfB is a sub-strategy of SoF as well as CE. 
Thus, we only have to compare the latter two strategies. CE 
is supported by the optimization module and the patrol 
route of the modeled SoF scenario has been chosen 
arbitrarily. The baseline strategy PfB is the worst one for  Blue 
if we exclude the CE strategies with worst distributions. If 
we then distribute emplacements in an intelligent, i.e. 
optimized, manner, Blue’s success rises as can be seen by the 
CE scenarios. Following strategy SoF with one patrol is 
nearly as successful (with the defined patrol route) as 
distributing 5 emplacements. This result basically confirms 
our results from IDFW18. The reasons for SoF’s success are 
the following: On the one hand, the patrol in our scenario is 
in an area where attackers approach with high probability. 
Thus the time needed to disturb the Red is quite short. On 
the other hand, there exists a chance that Red senses Blue 
before starting to prepare its attack. Then it gets discouraged 
and flees without any attack. For these two reasons, SoF 
seems to be the best strategy for Blue. This superiority might 
even rise when the patrol routes are also optimized or more 
patrols are distributed. 
Limitations
There are some limitations in our experiments. Concerning 
the optimization part, we can do a crossing of optimization 
and simulation runs. Although we optimized certain number 
of emplacements with and without considering the ballistic 
semantics, we only simulated the results of the former 
optimization. During the simulation, we then considered 
both ballistic grids again. In upcoming studies, we want to 
simulate the results of the latter optimization with both grids 
in order to check if a significant impact on Blue’s success can 
be measured. 
Another important limitation is that we are able to 
optimize the visibility of spotters, only. Additionally, we could 
define several optimization criterions, e.g. the reachability of 
possible attack points, in order to distribute QRFs outside the 
base also. One major challenge is the definition of the 
optimality if several criteria are considered. This is also subject 
to further research.
For an extensive comparison of the strategies, the 
following questions should be answered:
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
cover all cells? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be distributed such 
that most cells are covered? 
• What is a good ratio between covered cells and used 
emplacements/ patrols?
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
avoid any attack? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be placed such that 
most attacks are avoided?
• What is a  good ratio between avoided attacks and 
used emplacements/ patrols?
The first three questions can be answered for 
emplacements, but not for patrols since we currently are not 
able to optimize dynamic patrol routes. The last three 
questions could be answered by using simulation runs, but 
we have no hint for patrols to be defined without a 
corresponding optimization. Especially the third and sixth 
question is relevant since a notion of used resources and 
utility comes into account. The third question is basically 
answered for emplacements in figure 6.
The last limitation mentioned here is that only one 
specific Red behavior is modeled, which is also not evolving 
over time. We also always consider exactly a single attack and 
not multiple coordinated attacks which adapt to Blue’s 
strategy. In order to challenge these questions at least semi-
automated, we want to further extend our current approach 
with optimization techniques which are able to derive 
strategy settings automatically. Such a system could use 
evolutionary algorithms combined with data farming similar 
to Automated Red Teaming (ART) [3] and Automated Co-
Evolution (ACE) [3].
CONCLUSIONS
During this study, we evaluated the influence of considering 
semantic attachments to our terrain data on Blue’s success in 
terms of the regarded MoE PreventedShots. We wanted to 
check if it is worth to invest the effort to model or import 
such semantic attachments and model the reaction to it. We 
explicitly do not want to generate results like: “Blue’s MoE 
decreases when considering semantics, so we do not 
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consider it!” We claim that such a model is more realistic and 
thus more accurate. The question is if we want to invest the 
effort to improve such a model. As can be seen in the results 
of the optimization of emplacement positions, any 
information that is used to optimize some task must be 
based on an accurate model in order to generate correct 
results. For example, a spotter  distribution generated on a 
ballistic grid considering semantics performs very well in a 
simulation considering ballistic semantics but not necessarily 
in a simulation without considering ballistic semantics. 
We want to emphasize that the terrain data as well as the 
semantic attributes have not been modeled by us but are 
imported from a database of the German Armed Forces. We 
simply modeled the reaction to the attribute values, e.g. the 
top-speed restrictions of certain unit types on certain road 
types. Basically, we modeled effect of the semantics to the 
routing (road semantics) and to the ballistic threatening of 
cells (ballistic semantics). 
The influence of the ballistic semantics is statistically 
significant if the information is used to set up the strategy. It is 
not significant and even arbitrary if we just evaluate a given 
scenario or strategy. The impact of road semantics is not 
significant in our study. This last result was a surprise.
Additionally, we wanted to check if our optimization 
according to the grid-visibility results in a significant 
improvement of Blue’s success. During the investigation we 
learned that the latter question can be answered with a “yes”, 
i.e. there is a significant improvement, if the model of the 
optimization is close enough to the model of the simulation. 
As future work, we want to extend our approach as 
mentioned above. Additionally, we want to analyze the 
impact of the optimization, extend the system to be able to 
cope with several optimization criteria, develop an 
optimization for dynamic patrol routes and try to cope with 
coordinating and evolving red behavior.
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This Team participated in an ongoing study to examine the 
utility of distillation modeling in the Counter-IED 
(Improvised Explosive Devices) fight. In 
September, as part of that study, an Agent-Based 
Modeling workshop examining hard questions in 
the Counter-IED battle identified a set of problems 
that can be addressed by agent-based models and 
related methods such as data  farming. The 
questions covered C-IED needs in various 
categories including: insurgent network evolution 
and adaptation; red-teaming and technical gaming; 
C-IED initiative assessment; and recidivism. This 
team reviewed the output from the September 
workshop on agent-based modeling, extracted 
problems that can feasibly be addressed in a  rapid 
prototyping process, and began to design a 
software experiment that will address a selected 
problem. 
We begin with some background information 
on our overall question, lay out our objectives and 
the effort for this IDFW 19 work, and conclude with 
a way ahead for follow-on work.  
Background
In June 2009, JIEDDO began a study to examine the 
applicability and utility of agent-based modeling 
(ABM) and related techniques to its mission:
"The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization shall focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all 
Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant 
Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to 
defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic 
influence."  JIEDDO Mission Statement, DoD Directive 
2000.19E, February 14, 2006
The goal for this ongoing study is to address the 
following two questions:
• “Does ABM and related capabilities have applicability 
to JIEDDO questions and problems?” 
• “How should ABM and related capabilities be applied 
to JIEDDO questions and problems?”
The answers to both “Does?” and “How?” may be 
different for different classes of questions or specific 
questions. As a result, part of the purpose of the ABM study is 
to provide analysts straightforward procedures to determine 
when ABMs might be applicable and what tools and 
experimental design is appropriate for their questions. 
The ABM study encompasses two components or phases: 
1) an educational component to gain an internal 
understanding and capability in these processes, and 2) an 
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Figure 1 – Pythagoras “Peace” Scenario Spatial View
analytic component to apply these processes to questions of 
tactical, operational, and strategic interest to JIEDDO.
As one activity of Phase I or the Education Phase, an 
ABM Workshop was held in September, which focused on a 
set of JIEDDO questions and IED related problems and 
provided an opportunity for JIEDDO partners to give an 
overview of their current and planned work. The workshop 
consisted of five teams, producing 24 task plans that described 
the potential use of ABMs and other techniques to address 
relevant questions.  Task plans included topics such as:
• Self-organizing graphs of data relationships
• Indirect Network Attack 
• Identifying Important Link Layers for Impacting the 
Insurgent Networks in Afghanistan
• Define “High Value Individual” 
• Emergence of an Insurgent Cell
• Insurgent Networks
The scope of related techniques of interest for addressing 
these study topics includes: agent-based models and 
modeling environments; social networking analysis tools; 
data farming tools; and analysis and visualization capabilities 
for model outputs.
As part of Phase II or the Analytic Phase of the ABM 
study, Team 6 at IDFW 19 began the task of selecting a subset 
of the questions of interest related to countering IEDs at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels and then 
identifying and applying appropriate ABMs and 
other relevant techniques to address those 
questions.
Objectives
Team 6’s objectives for IDFW 19 were to:
• Examine Task Plans generated by the 
JIEDDO ABM Workshop 
• Select potential candidate(s) for follow–up 
study and analysis
• Analyze and detail the question(s) being 
addressed
• Establish requirements for:
o Modeling environment
o Data requirements
o Analysis tools 
• Prepare plan ahead for activity between 
IDFW 19 and leading up to IDFW 20
IDFW19 EFFORT
The team began by examining the 24 task plans 
and selected a set of potential candidates to 
examine in further detail. These candidates fell 
into the category of “Attack the Network”, one of 
three JIEDDO primary operations in the Counter-
IED battle (the other two operations are “Defeat 
the Device” and “Train the Force”). These 
candidates are hard IED questions related to 
attacking the network and included questions 
such as:
• What do insurgent networks look like? Who is in the 
network? Who is not? 
• How do we distinguish networks that should be 
attacked vs. networks that should be attritted vs. 
networks that should be co-opted?
• Will removing specific nodes destabilize a network? 
What are the 2nd and 3rd order effects?  What are the 
potential unintended consequences?
Given that a  network perspective is a primary 
component of the questions, the team decided to start looking 
at network analysis and visualization tools within the context 
of an abstracted “insurgent” scenario in the agent-based 
model Pythagoras. These tools may provide insights into 
JIEDDO topics of interest such as “Emergence of Insurgent 
Cells.” We started with some simple networks to understand 
the issues and will progress to more complexity in follow-on 
work. 
Why networks? Networks are useful representational 
schemes for understanding relations and interactions between 
agents (in our case, individuals) and events. Types of relations 
between two or more agents include such things as similarity 
(homophily) or spatial (distance) comparisons. Interactions 
might include events such as sensing or shooting, or other acts 
between agents. A network view, by using a different 
representation of relational data, has the potential of 
discovering underlying relationships that are hidden from 
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Figure 2 – “Peace” Scenario - Color Space View
other techniques, yet complements those techniques at the 
same time.
The next sections discuss the issue of modeling networks 
in an ABM, the Pythagoras scenario we used as an aid to 
understand network tools and analysis, and some results and 
surprises from our work.
Extracting Networks from ABMs 
Since our ultimate goal is to understand and analyze 
insurgent networks, we wanted some means to model 
networks in an ABM implicitly and not explicitly, i.e., where 
the networks evolve dynamically based on agent attributes 
and behaviors and environmental characteristics and not 
fixed as input to the model. For example, both MANA and 
Pythagoras use a communications network to specify which 
agents send messages to other agents. However, those 
networks are fixed such that agent A cannot send a message 
to agent B if those links were not established as input to the 
model.
We then examined the use of an interaction-based 
network, where interactions between agents generate a 
dynamically evolving network. Pythagoras uses color 
attributes, i.e., red, green and blue (RGB) values for agents 
that are affected by changes in agent state, or a number of 
agent-agent interactions, such as shooting or communication. 
Pythagoras also allows the user to specify affiliation between 
agents by how “far” an agent is from another agent in color 
space, i.e., the distance (either Euclidean or Manhattan) 
between points based on the RGB values. The affiliations 
belong to four categories: Unit, Friend, Neutral and Enemy, 
so each agent has one of these affiliations for every other 
agent and these affiliations can be asymmetrical.
We next defined an affiliation network by using an RGB 
distance threshold such that if the RGB distance between two 
agents was less than the threshold, then a link was 
established.  This network evolves over time based on agent 
RGB changes associated with interaction events, and was the 
focus of our network extraction efforts. We collected network 
data from a single run of a simple Pythagoras scenario, which 
we describe next, and visualized that data using several open-
source tools. 
Pythagoras “Peace” Scenario 
The "Peace" scenario is provided as part of the Pythagoras 
distribution (we made some changes in the initial 
distribution of agents). The scenario is composed of a single 
Red Instigator, a population of 50 Purple Locals, and a small 
Blue force (10 agents). The Red Instigator is continually 
broadcasting pro-red/anti-blue messages to all the agents 
29 - IDFW 19 - Team 6
   
   
Figure 3 – “Peace” Scenario Network View
(although the messages currently have no effect on Blue), 
and the Blue force interacts “positively” with the Locals. 
At each time step, the Red Instigator broadcasts a 
message that changes Purple Local agents within range of the 
broadcast by making them more “Red” and less “Blue”. 
Concurrently, Blue agents move around and interact with 
Purple Locals within their range by making them more 
“Blue” and less “Red”. These interactions have a random 
component, so that the competition between the Red and 
Blue messages affects each Local agent differently. A snapshot 
of one time step, showing a spatial view of the scenario, is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
At each time step, we collected data representing each 
interaction that caused a color  change of a Local agent, as 
well as the current color of all the Locals (because the Red 
and Blue agents didn’t change color, our focus was on the 
evolution of the Local affiliation network).
In the next section, we describe two different 
visualizations of that data as well as some observations on 
how data farming might be applied to the visualization of 
network data, and not just for farming over input parameters 
of the model. 
Results and Surprises
Figure 2 displays a “Color Space” view for one time step of 
the scenario. While not a network view, it does give a 
different perspective of the data, showing how each agent 
relates to the other agents based on their Red and Blue color 
attributes (Green was not used). The “closer” the agents are 
to other agents in this “space” indicates whether they are 
tied together in the network.  
To derive a network view, we used the color distance and 
a threshold value to indicate which agents were affiliated with 
other agents. Figure 3 shows four affiliation networks for four 
separate snapshots in time. In each network, a node is a 
specific agent, and a link indicates that the two agents on 
either end of the link are within the threshold distance we 
specified. As the agents interact, their color changes resulting 
in the creation and deletion of links. And as those links evolve, 
other structures, such as cliques, form. Our goal is to 
understand the formation of these structures and how they 
are affected by changes in the input parameters of the model. 
To display our results, we used the software package 
SoNIA (Social Network Image Animator - http://
www.stanford.edu/group/sonia/), as well as some code we 
wrote during the workshop to translate Pythagoras data into a 
form suitable for display by SoNIA. 
During our work, we encountered two surprises:
1. Extremely simple color distribution and 
interactions in Pythagoras lead to complex network 
interactions; and, 
2. Data Farming over visualization/analysis 
parameters could provide additional insight. 
WAY AHEAD
The plan for ongoing work between now and IDFW 20 and 
beyond will focus on modeling insurgent networks and 
continuing to look at network extraction and visualization 
tools and techniques, specifically:
1. Gain a better understanding of network analysis 
algorithms, animation, etc., especially as they relate 
to time-series or longitudinal data;
2. Expand the scenario to a more complex insurgent 
model, e.g., adapting a clique model previously 
implemented in Pythagoras;
3. Continue using Pythagoras, leveraging previous 
work and possibly running experiments on DOD 
HPC resources;
4. Examine the derivation of network statistics time-
series and end-of-run MOEs as part of Data 
Farming analysis, optimizers, and ART (Automated 
Red Teaming) drivers; and
5. Examine methods of visualizing and comparing 
collectives of multiple networks, obtained by data 
farming across network parameter spaces.
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Team 7: Social Simulations and 
Survey Data Focus Group
TEAM 7 LEAD
Steve Lieberman 
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the social behavioral characteristics of the 
population in irregular warfare operations presents a major 
challenge to the defense modeling and simulation 
communities. However, a clear need has been identified for 
the development of models, methods, and tools to address 
the behavioral and social aspects of large human groups.  
Objectives
The primary focus for this group was to provide an open 
forum for the discussion of cutting-edge approaches to 
modeling large collectives.  Numerous questions were 
addressed regarding the goals, uses, and feasibility of 
different approaches to social simulation, from wholly 
conceptual to purely technical. Team 7 held three discussion 
sessions as follows:
• Session 1. The features of TRAC-Monterey’s Cultural 
Geography Model, an agent-based model describing 
the social and behavioral patterns of civilian 
populations during COIN, were described.
• Session 2. Team members were tasked with the 
clarification of specific questions.  The session 
addressed the nuances and limitations of current 
approaches to modeling large human groups, with 
discussion aimed at identifying data  farming 
methodologies to address the limitations in what were 
most promising M&S methods.  
• Session 3. An overview of team 7 was provided. 
Through the discussion sessions the team had the 
following goals:
• From a security and defense perspective identify the 
most important differences between modeling Large 
Groups vs. Small Groups.
• Identify the goals of modeling societies.
• Identify the data that is required for social simulation.
• On a conceptual and technical level, find out how to 
deal with the conflation of belief and behavior change.
• Find the most effective ways to communicate model 
and simulation output to analysts or decision makers.
SUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD
Based on the Team 7 discussions resulted in the following 
food for thought as we move forward:
• Agent-Based Models/Multi-Agent Systems provide a 
viable body of simulation literature, including 
compelling ideas from individual (cognitive psych), 
team-based (social psychology) and organizational 
(network) modeling and simulation.
• Combining agent-based modeling and network 
modeling techniques can produce authentic 
representations of dynamic social structures that are 
especially important for course of action analyses
• Widespread interest in social simulation, within both 
the defense communities, and academic communities, 
has underscored the need to cultivate new research 
communities for modeling societies.
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Team 8: Data Farming in Support of NATO
TEAM 8
Dr. Gary Horne, Chair
USA
LTC Stephan Seichter, Co-chair
DEU
SUMMARY
The NATO Modeling and Simulation Group has approved 
an exploratory team to examine the veracity of forming a 
task group to examine data farming in support of NATO. 
This exploratory team, called ET-029, continued its activity at 
IDFW 19, convening focus groups to further  this 
examination.
Given the following basic points, at the NATO Modeling 
and Simulation Group meeting in October the exploratory 
team received support from 10 nations for consideration as a 
task group,.
• The nature of scenarios that NATO forces are faced 
with in today’s world are uncertain and complex. 
• Data farming combines rapid prototyping of agent-
based and other models with the exploratory power of 
advanced computing to rapidly 
generate insight into questions.
• Data farming allows the decision 
maker to more fully understand the 
landscape of possibilities and also 
allows for the discovery of outliers.
• Six realms of data farming are model development, 
high performance computing, visualization of large 
simulation data output, rapid prototyping of 
scenarios, parameter space exploration through 
efficient design of experiments, and collaborative 
processes.
This task group, pending final approval, will  be called 
MSG-088 and will hold its first official meeting in May 2010 in 
Paris.  Here at IDFW 19, possible support areas of work were 
discussed, including hardware, overview of models, example 
scenarios, efficient designs, visualization, analysis tools, 
evolutionary algorithms, effects based planning, and decision 
support.  Application areas thought to be worthwhile include 
winning hearts and minds and the cascading consequences of 
actions in that area, command and control and the interface 
challenges of the multi-national forces of NATO, peace 
support operations, urban operations, anti-piracy operations, 
training, and defeating improvised explosive devices.
Team 8 concluded with plans to contribute to further 
discussions of potential  MSG-088 efforts.  These plans include 
another ET-029 meeting to be held following IDFW 20 on 
Friday 26 March 2010 in Monterey, California, 
USA.  Please contact gehorne@nps.edu if 
you are interested in participating.
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International Data Farming Workshop 20
When: 22 - 25 March 2010
Where: 	
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Data farming is a capability that makes use of high performance computing to run models many times. This 
capability gives modelers and analysts an enhanced ability to discover trends and outliers in results, do 
sensitivity studies, verify and validate over extended ranges of input parameters, and consider modeling and 
analyzing non-linear phenomena with characteristics that cannot be precisely defined. The International Data 
Farming Workshops have been a forum for the exploration of important questions for many years. The cores 
of the workshops are teams that are formed around these questions. These multi-disciplinary teams use data 
farming practices including simulations, such as agent based models, rapid model prototyping, high performance 
computing, and data analysis, state-of-the-art design of experiments, parameter space exploration, and 
collaborative environments. The first workshop took place in Maui in 1999 and the workshop coming up in 
Monterey next month is number 20. We now have 17 teams lined up for IDFW 20 and whether you are a 
newcomer to the workshops or have participated in the past, we welcome you to participate! 
IDFW 19 2009 Tentative Agenda
Sunday, March 21: Opening reception and dinner
Monday, March 22: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Wednesday, March 23 - 24: Work in teams (optional plenary sessions in the mornings)
Thursday, March 25: Outbriefs and Closing Ceremony in the afternoon
Call for Team Leaders / Plenary 
Speakers: 
Please email gehorne@nps.edu with your 
choice of teams and if you want to lead a 
team or present a plenary briefing. 
Theme: Enrichment
International Data Farming Workshop 20
March 22-25, 2010
Monterey, California
Issue 7 - Workshop 19
Scythe - Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community
Issue 7 - Workshop 19
Seed Center for Data Farming
273 Glasgow Hall ~ Naval Postgraduate School ~ Monterey, CA 93950
